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FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN EUROPE:
PRE- AND POST-MAASTRICHT
1. Introduction
Fiscal consolidation has been on the agenda of policy makers around the world for most of the
past decade. In a number of countries budgetary trends were judged to be unsustainable in the
mid-80s. Among those countries that undertook a rigorous turnaround in fiscal policy at that
time were Denmark and Ireland. Surprisingly, fiscal contraction did not entail an economic
downturn in these countries. In both cases, the decline in public expenditure was more than
offset by the strong rise in private consumption and investment. This observation was at odds
with mainstream economic beliefs concerning the short-run economic effects of fiscal policy,
and subsequently a large body of literature has evolved trying to find a rationale for the
seemingly “perverse” effects of fiscal consolidation. A seminal contribution to the field was
made by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) who advanced the hypothesis that expectational effects
were responsible for the positive outcome. According to this view, fiscal consolidation can
lead to improved expectations about long-term growth and be followed by an increase rather
than a reduction in current private-sector spending.
However, the profession has not yet reached a consensus on the effects of fiscal
consolidation. This is no surprise since there is also strong disagreement among economists
about the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy during “normal” times. In a recent survey,
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) report that the issue whether budget deficits have Keynesian,
neoclassical or Ricardian effects on the economy1 has not yet been settled. An empirical
selection of the appropriate school is difficult since the theories have observationally
equivalent implications in some respects. For instance, the Keynesian and the neoclassical
view agree that fiscal consolidation leads to an increase in national saving whereas Ricardian
Equivalence predicts that national saving is not affected.2 The literature on the effects of fiscal
consolidation adds to this uncertainty by claiming that – under certain circumstances – the
                                                
1 For an exposition of these alternative views see Barro (1989), Bernheim (1989) and Eisner (1989).
2 If and only if, fiscal consolidation is achieved by an increase in non-distorting taxes, taking the path
of government expenditure as given.2
impact of budget deficits on national saving (and other macroeconomic variables) can be
reversed.
The literature analyzing fiscal consolidation episodes can be divided into two major
branches. The first, building on the work of Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1996), concentrates on
the factors affecting the success and failure of fiscal contractions. A successful consolidation is
defined in terms of reaching the goal of a permanent reduction in the government debt - GDP
ratio. Recently, Heylen and Everaert (2000) have tested the most frequently cited hypotheses
explaining the outcome of fiscal consolidations: first, the composition of the program, second,
its size and persistence, third, the level and growth rate of public debt, fourth, the international
macroeconomic environment and, fifth, exchange rate developments. Their results give support
to all of these factors, apart from the size and persistence hypothesis which I will submit to
extensive testing in the following. While having the merit of testing a variety of determinants in
a single framework their conclusions have to be regarded with some caution as Heylen and
Everaert do not take account of the time-series dimension of the data in their regressions.3
The second branch of the literature distinguishes itself by measuring the success of fiscal
consolidations in terms of macroeconomic rather than fiscal outcomes. In a recent paper,
Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000)4 have investigated the relationship between fiscal policy
and national saving. Reviewing the main theoretical contributions, they conclude that this
relationship may be nonlinear under certain circumstances. In a broad sense, the non-linearity
arises from the influence of fiscal policy on private-sector expectations. In an environment
where private agents feel that an unchanged policy stance is unsustainable and will sooner or
later lead to economic disruptions, the implementation of a fiscal consolidation program can
drastically improve the private sector’s assessment of future income developments. Two
propositions emerge from the theoretical literature: On the one hand, the analyses of Blanchard
(1990), Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999) imply that the government debt - GDP ratio is
the variable affecting private-sector expectations. Whenever the debt ratio is either near a
critical value or grows at a rapid pace, a fiscal consolidation program does not lead to a rise in
national saving: the private sector reacts to improved long-term prospects by dissaving more
than the government saves. On the other hand, nonlinear fiscal policy effects may depend on the
                                                
3 The same caveat applies to the empirical work of Alesina and Ardagna (1998).
4 Building on earlier works by Giavazzi and Pagano ( 1990,  1996) estimating the effects of fiscal
consolidation (and expansion) on private consumption.3
size and persistence of the fiscal impulse, as illustrated by Drazen (1990). In a situation of
unsustainable fiscal policy the private sector will only revise its expectations if the government
gives a clear signal that it will permanently alter its course towards sound public finances. In
their paper, Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (hence GJP) test both hypotheses in a panel data
model, finding overwhelming support for the size and persistence proposition.
Figure 1: Cyclically-adjusted Budget Balance and Output Gap for the European Union











Source:  OECD (2000a)
The GJP analysis serves as a starting point for the present paper for the following reason.
Their results are of paramount importance for policy makers in the European Union. As can be
seen in figure 1 European governments have gradually reduced budget deficits in the 1990s.
Still, most countries have refrained from drastic consolidation measures because they did not
want to dampen economic growth that was already sluggish – during most of the 1990s the
output gap as calculated by the OECD was negative. In contrast, the results reported in GJP
should encourage European governments to intensify their efforts on the road to a balanced
budget. Such action, they argue, could lead to stronger growth even in the short-run. However, it
has to be asked whether their estimation results are robust since this is the precondition for4
useful policy advice. This question is addressed in the empirical application: I estimate
national saving regressions for a panel of 14 EU countries5 along the lines of GJP.
It is shown that their finding of a nonlinear relationship between fiscal policy and national
saving might be spurious. This is due to two problems: (i) Panel data models do not allow for
cross-country heterogeneity apart from a country-specific intercept. I find evidence for the
proposition made by Haque, Pesaran and Sharma ( 2000) that the statistical significance of
nonlinear effects in panel regressions could be spurious due to systematic slope heterogeneity.
(ii) The work of GJP and many other applied studies share a common problem: the
identification of fiscal policy episodes. Usually, a large change in the cyclically-adjusted
budget balance over two years is defined as a strong and persistent fiscal impulse.6 Apart from
the ad hoc character of this definition, this measure suffers from the extensive revisions of
structural budget balances in the course of time.7 In the remainder of the fourth section of this
paper, I try to remedy the second problem and propose an alternative definition of a fiscal
consolidation episode. In 1992, the year in which the Maastricht Treaty was signed, most
countries in the European Union did not comply with the fiscal convergence criteria. If – which
has been controversially discussed  – European governments credibly committed to fiscal
discipline at that time, the years from 1993 to the present can be regarded as a persistent fiscal
consolidation episode.8 Using this definition of a fiscal consolidation episode, the panel
regressions are re-estimated. Again, I find no evidence for nonlinear effects of fiscal policy.
However, individual-country regressions imply that a non-linearity might be present in some
cases. All in all, the results indicate that the case for non-linear or non-Keynesian effects of
fiscal policy is less stringent than claimed by parts of the literature.
                                                
5  Luxembourg is not included due to data (non)availability.
6 See, for example, OECD (1996) and GJP (2000).
7 The structural budget balance is not only affected by revisions of the underlying net lending series,
but also by the re-estimation of potential output. An example can highlight the point: Whereas the
OECD ( 1996: 34) reported a cyclically-adjusted budget surplus of 0.5 per cent (in relation to
potential GDP) for Australia for the year 1982, four years later (OECD 2000a) it reported a
structural deficit of 3.6 per cent for the same country and year.
8 Figure 2 (appendix) shows indeed that budget deficits have considerably decreased throughout
Europe in the 1990s.5
2. Episodes of Fiscal Contraction and Expansion
This section lays the ground for the subsequent empirical examination of the hypothesis that the
effects of large and persistent fiscal impulses are opposed in sign from those of moderate fiscal
impulses. In the literature, it is a common procedure to identify episodes of strong fiscal
contraction and expansion with large and durable changes in the structural budget balance.
Following GJP (2000: 1268) I define a ‘large and persistent fiscal impulse’ as a change in the
general government cyclically-adjusted budget balance equivalent to at least 1.5 percentage
points of potential GDP per year over a two-year period.9  This ensures that the results of this
paper are directly comparable to theirs. Table 1 reports the episodes identified by GJP as well
as the episodes I obtained using their definition of large and persistent fiscal expansions and
contractions.
An inspection of the table reveals that while GJP recovered 30 expansion and 51 consolidation
episodes, I only obtain 7 and 6, respectively. A minor part of this divergence can be attributed
to different data availability. For some countries, the OECD has omitted earlier data since the
year of data collection (1997) by GJP due to revisions of national accounts. For instance, I
could not account for the very prominent fiscal consolidation episode of Denmark in the mid-
80s because the OECD (2000a) does not publish data on the structural budget balance before
1987 for this country anymore. Still, the largest part of deviation seems to be explained by data
revisions. As was argued in the last section, structural balances are affected by revisions of
unadjusted budget balances and of potential output. Probably some of GJP’s significant fiscal
impulses were only slightly above the 1.5 per-cent margin and are below it when considering
more recent data.10 Furthermore, even in those cases where my episodes correspond to those of
GJP there is no perfect coincidence. Although there are some clear-cut
                                                
9  Other authors make use of similar definitions: the OECD ( 1996) identifies fiscal consolidation
episodes with an increase in the structural budget surplus by at least 3 per cent over two years,
Heylen and Everaert (2000) with an increase by 2 per cent over two years. Giavazzi and Pagano
(1996) look at changes in structural deficits over time horizons of one to four years, while Alesina
and Ardagna (1998) consider improvements in the primary structural balance.
10 Using a similar definition of consolidation episodes, the OECD (1996: 34) identifies 12 cases of
significant fiscal contraction in EU countries. It is thus very probable that it is impossible to obtain
identical episodes unless one uses not only the same data source (here: OECD databases) but also
exactly the same publication. Consequently, the identification of episodes is not time-invariant.6










Germany 70–00 70–96 74–75, 89–91 71–72, 76–77,
81–83, 92–94
France 74–00 72–96 77–78, 81–82 72–73, 79–80,
83–84, 95–96








Spain 70–00 70–96 81–82, 89–90 86–87, 91–93,
95–96
Netherlands 74–00 74–96 76–80 74–75, 81–83,
87–88, 90–92
Belgium 74–00 74–96 80–81 79–80 93–94 74–75, 81–87,
92–94
Sweden 84–00 83–96 91–93 90–93 86–87, 96–98 83–84, 86–88,
94–96
Austria 74–00 74–96 75–76 93–94 74–75, 77–78,
80–81, 83–85,
95–96
Denmark 88–00 81–96 81–82, 87–90 83–86












Ireland 77–00 77–96 89–90, 94–95 88–89 77–78, 82–84,
86–88, 91–92
Number of
Episodes 7 30 6 51
aA large and persistent fiscal contraction (expansion) episode is defined as a period in which the
cyclically-adjusted budget balance (in percent of potential GDP) increases (decreases) by at least 1.5
percentage points per year over a two-year period. —  
b
Own calculations based on OECD (2000a)
figures on cyclically-adjusted budget balances.— 
c
Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000), table A.2, pp.
1286––1287.7
episodes of large and persistent fiscal impulses, the exact dating of these episodes is far from
being uncontroversial. Abstracting from these problems for a moment, the empirical analysis of
GJP will be re-conducted in section 4.2 in order to check for robustness of their results. Both
sets of episodes will be considered in turn to avoid premature rejection of the evidence
reported in GJP (2000).
The strong sensitivity of this identification procedure already casts doubt on any results
relying on these episodes. To avoid this source of uncertainty, an alternative concept will be
analyzed in section 4.2: I propose to view the post-Maastricht period starting in 1993 as a
fiscal consolidation episode. Indeed budget deficits have considerably decreased since that
time throughout the European Union. However, for the expectations effects of fiscal
consolidation to materialize it is necessary that the commitment of governments implied by the
Maastricht Treaty was judged credible by the private sector ex ante. Unfortunately, the
credibility assumption cannot be tested on historical data. It can only be established ex post that
all countries made considerable efforts in order to qualify for European Monetary Union. While
this caveat has to be kept in mind, the definition of the post-Maastricht era as a consolidation
episode has the attractive feature of being time-invariant.8
3. The Empirical Model
In this section, the empirical framework employed in section 4 is presented. Following the
strategy of GJP (2000), I estimate single-equation fixed-effects models for a panel of 14 EU
countries for the years 1970 to 2000.11 The national saving rate (as a percentage of potential
output) is chosen as the dependent variable. As GJP point out this allows one to relate the
estimation results directly to the Ricardian equivalence proposition. While standard
neoclassical theory predicts that national saving should respond positively to increases in taxes
and negatively to increases in government spending, Ricardian equivalence implies that, for a
given path of government expenditure, changes in (non-distorting) taxes and transfers have no
effect on overall saving. Furthermore, if the ‘size and persistence’ hypothesis is correct the
effects of fiscal policy on national saving mentioned for the neoclassical view should be
dampened or even reversed during episodes of large and persistent fiscal impulses. This
hypothesis will be tested in section 4.
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where S is national saving, Y* potential output, (Y-Y*)/Y* the output gap, r the real short-
term interest rate, T net taxes and G government spending.12 All variables apart from the real
interest rate are scaled by potential GDP to avoid problems of heteroscedasticity. The slope
coefficients are assumed to be the same across countries, and uit are random shocks assumed to
be distributed independently and identically with zero mean and a constant variance. The
country-specific constants a0i (the fixed effects) are the only source of heterogeneity in this
framework. Note that the tax and spending variable appear twice on the right-hand side of
equation [1]. Both variables are interacted with a dummy variable d which captures the
episodes of large and persistent fiscal impulses reported in table 1. Equation [1] is estimated
applying the instrumental variables estimator to account for the potential endogeneity of the
                                                
11  GJP (2000) estimate their models using panel data comprising 18 OECD countries for the years 1970
to 1996.
12  See Appendix for a description of the variables used in the empirical application.9
interest rate and net taxes. The first is instrumented with its lagged value, the latter with the
cyclically-adjusted budget balance.
As Haque, Pesaran and Sharma ( 2000) demonstrate the disregard of cross-country
heterogeneity in panel regressions can lead to spurious results concerning the nonlinear effects
of the independent variables. This point is illustrated in Figure 3 drawn from their paper. As
can easily be seen, estimation of a panel data model will exhibit strong non-linearities, even
though the country-specific relationship between variables Y and X is linear. In order to avoid
spurious inference, I supplement the panel regressions with country-specific estimates of
equation [1]. Moreover, I report the mean group estimator advocated by Haque, Pesaran and
Sharma (2000) which is calculated as the arithmetic average of country-specific coefficients.
Figure 3: Fixed-effects Regression under Heterogeneous Slopes
Percent 
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Source:   Haque, Pesaran and Sharma (2000), p.62. 10
4. Empirical Results
4.1 The Effects of Large and Persistent Fiscal Impulses: the GJP Approach
In this section the fixed-effects regressions reported in GJP (2000: 1274) are re-estimated.
Table 2 presents the results for the panel of 14 European Union countries. The first column
reports the estimates of a benchmark regression where the effects of fiscal policy are restricted
to be linear. As can be seen the national saving rate depends positively on its lagged values and
the output gap, while the effect of real short-term interest rates is statistically insignificant.
National saving responds positively to an increase in net taxes and negatively to a rise in
government spending, in line with the predictions of mainstream macroeconomic theory. The
statistically significant coefficient of net taxes seems to contradict the Ricardian equivalence
proposition.13
The remaining columns of table 2 report the estimates of regressions testing for the stability
of the relationship between fiscal policy and national saving. Columns (2) to (4) allow for
nonlinear effects of fiscal policy by interacting net taxes and government spending with an
interaction dummy variable capturing either large fiscal impulses or large consolidations or
large expansions (columns labeled “own” in table 1). Indeed, some of the interaction terms are
statistically significant and conform to the theoretical prediction of the expectations view since
the effects of fiscal policy are dampened. Interestingly, nonlinear effects of fiscal policy can
only be detected for large and persistent expansions, not for consolidation episodes. During
strong fiscal expansions the effects of taxation on national saving are even reversed. As half of
the coefficients of the interaction terms are insignificant, the regression was re-run with the
episodes of large fiscal impulses identified by GJP (columns labeled “GJP” in table 1). The
results in column (5) of table 2 show significant nonlinear effects for both net taxes and for
government spending. Yet, these effects are considerably lower than those reported by GJP
(2000: 1274).
                                                
13  GJP (2000) interpret this as evidence against Ricardian equivalence. However, one has to keep in
mind that net taxes are mainly composed of distorting taxes.11




















































– and large increase in surplus 0.052
(0.376)
















– and large increase in surplus –0.066
(–0.557)
– and large decrease in surplus 0.176
(2.562)
Adjusted R
2 0.889 0.889 0.887 0.890 0.872
aFixed-effects estimation of equation [1]. Sample period is 1970 to 2000. t-values are reported in
parentheses. Statistically significant estimates (at the 95 per cent level) of the interacted fiscal variables are
shown in bold. — 
b
Benchmark regression. None of the fiscal variables is interacted with the dummy
variables. — 
c
In this regression, the fiscal variables are interacted with a dummy variable capturing
episodes of large and persistent fiscal impulses regardless of their direction. — 
d
In this regression, the
fiscal variables are interacted with a dummy variable capturing episodes of large and persistent fiscal
contractions. — 
e
In this regression, the fiscal variables are interacted with a dummy variable capturing
episodes of large and persistent fiscal expansions.— 
f
In this regression, the fiscal variables are interacted
with the dummy variable reported in Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano ( 2000): 1286–1287, capturing
episodes of large and persistent fiscal impulses. Here, the sample period is 1970 to 1996.
It is not clear whether these findings should be interpreted as evidence in favor of the
expectations view on the effects of large fiscal impulses. The statistically significant nonlinear
effects reported in table 2 could be due to neglected cross-country heterogeneity. In order to
check for this possibility equation [1] was estimated for each of the 14 individual countries.12
The results are reported in table 3. The dummy variable capturing episodes of large and
persistent fiscal impulses corresponds exactly to the one used by GJP in their paper. As can be
seen, there is overwhelming evidence of slope heterogeneity across individual countries.
Furthermore, not a single country exibits statistically significant nonlinear effects of fiscal
policy.14, 15 The mean group estimator reported in the last row of table 3 corroborates this
finding.
In an additional regression – not reported here16 – equation [1] was estimated with an
alternative set of interacted fiscal variables. The dummy variables used for interaction capture
the large and persistent fiscal impulses reported in table 1, columns „Own“. Again there was no
evidence for nonlinear effects of fiscal policy.
These results cast doubt on the validity of the evidence presented in GJP ( 2000). Their
finding of nonlinear effects of fiscal poliy on national saving is very probably due to neglected
slope heterogeneity. In addition, the identification of fiscal episodes is ambiguous, as was
pointed out earlier. All in all, it seems as though this approach cannot provide robust results.
                                                
14  For Austria, the interacted tax and spending variables are significant at the 10 percent level. In the
case of Ireland, the interacted spending variable is significant at the 10 percent level.
15  In addition, for the panel regressions shown in columns (2) to (4) individual-country regressions were
run in order to check if the detected non-linearities were spurious. The results of this exercise do not
differ qualitatively from those reported in Table 3. The interacted fiscal variables were not significant
for any country, regardless of whether large fiscal impulses, consolidations or expansions were
considered. Detailed results are available from the author upon request.
16  Detailed results are available from the author on request.13
















Germany 38.36 0.34 0.54 –0.17 0.51 –0.08 –1.43 0.08
(6.66) (3.97) (4.75) (–1.42) (2.91) (–0.34) (–5.16) (0.35)
France 56.58 0.06 0.83 0.10 –0.37 –0.05 –1.06 0.02
(3.96) (0.48) (4.16) (0.43) (–1.74) (–0.20) (–2.37) (0.11)
United Kingdom 13.42 0.42 0.59 0.08 –0.61 0.35 0.37 –0.35
(0.67) (0.60) (1.60) (0.24) (–1.18) (1.43) (0.44) (–1.43)
Italy 37.47 0.39 0.56 0.19 0.04 0.34 –1.33 –0.20
(5.52) (1.44) (4.25) (0.98) (0.12) (0.78) (–3.34) (–0.68)
Spain 50.25 –0.85 1.26 –0.67 0.42 –0.50 –0.63 0.42
(1.92) (–0.46) (1.16) (–0.39) (0.16) (–0.46) (–0.71) (0.45)
Netherlands 64.37 –0.10 0.79 –0.28 –1.70 1.34 0.01 –0.99
(3.57) (–0.41) (2.59) (–1.22) (–1.42) (1.35) (0.01) (–1.37)
Belgium 37.12 0.03 0.87 –0.44 0.42 –0.12 –0.82 0.08
(3.35) (0.11) (2.90) (–1.31) (1.05) (–0.26) (–2.30) (0.26)
Sweden 34.64 0.03 1.13 –0.03 –0.21 –0.08 –0.23 0.06
(1.74) (0.07) (2.26) (–0.09) (–0.53) (–0.25) (–0.38) (0.19)
Austria 2.83 0.30 0.65 –0.19 –0.59 1.17 1.18 –1.03
(0.18) (1.72) (4.31) (–1.94) (–0.81) (1.81) (1.30) (–1.87)
Denmark 33.14 0.47 0.74 0.23 0.13 –0.35 –0.87 0.36
(1.26) (1.21) (1.91) (0.64) (0.22) (–0.65) (–0.82) (0.71)
Finland 50.18 –0.10 1.07 0.16 0.50 –0.77 –1.44 0.82
(7.37) (–0.79) (3.61) (0.62) (1.21) (–1.87) (–3.00) (1.72)
Greece 33.02 –0.25 0.89 –1.10 0.28 –0.26 –0.66 0.07
(0.56) (–0.18) (0.87) (–0.68) (0.27) (–0.29) (–0.41) (0.16)
Portugal 30.14 0.20 0.37 0.02 2.13 –0.81 –2.38 0.15
(0.79) (0.47) (0.37) (0.02) (0.56) (–0.33) (–1.38) (0.09)
Ireland 31.98 0.63 0.11 –0.19 0.09 –0.77 –1.23 0.56
(1.50) (2.15) (0.50) (–0.60) (0.06) (–1.59) (–2.78) (1.87)
Mean Group 36.68 0.11 0.74 –0.16 0.07 –0.04 –0.75 0.00
(2.30) (1.41) (2.43) (–1.68) (1.65) (–1.51) (–0.87) (0.98)
aEstimation of equation [1] for individual countries. Sample period is 1970 to 1996 in general, shorter for some
countries due to data (non-)availability. t-values are reported in parentheses. Definition of the “large and
persistent fiscal impulse” variable according to Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000). See their table A.2: 1286–
1287 for details or table 1, columns „GJP“,  in this paper.14
4.2 The Effects of Fiscal Policy on National Saving: Pre- and Post-Maastricht
In this section, I re-estimate the panel regressions using an alternative definition of fiscal
consolidation episodes. The post-Maastricht period starting in 1993 is defined as a common
consolidation episode for the 14 EU countries considered in this paper. Table 4 reports the
estimation results. In a first regression a dummy, taking the value 1 between 1993 and 2000,
was incorporated. As can be seen this variable is statistically significant which is an indication
of a structural break. In a second regression (column 2 of table 4), it was checked whether this
can be attributed to changing fiscal policy effects. For this purpose the tax and spending
variables were interacted with the post-Maastricht dummy. The results show that there is no
evidence for nonlinear effects. Rather the dynamics of national saving seem to have changed in
the 1990s: in an additional regression – not reported here17 – all independent variables were
interacted with the dummy variable. Only the coefficient of interacted lagged national saving
was statistically significant, with a positive sign. This suggests that the long-run effects of
saving determinants may have increased in the 1990s.


































aFixed-effects estimation of equation [1]. Sample period is 1970 to 2000. T-values are reported in parentheses.
Statistically significant estimates (at the 95 per cent level) of the interacted variables and the post-Maastricht
dummy are shown in bold. — 
b
Benchmark regression. A “post-Maastricht” dummy variable is included as
additional regressor which takes the value 1 from 1993 on. — 
c
In this regression, the fiscal variables are
interacted with the “post-Maastricht” dummy variable which takes the value 1 from 1993 on.
                                                
17  Detailed results are available from the author on request.15
The results of country-specific regressions are summarized in table 5. Again the estimates
show considerable variation across countries pointing to the inappropriateness of the slope
homogeneity assumption underlying the panel estimates. In most cases, the coefficients of the
variables capturing nonlinear effects of taxation are statistically insignificant. These
conclusions are confirmed by the mean group estimates reported in the last row of table 5.
Interestingly, non-linearities show up in some prominent cases. The effects of fiscal policy on
national saving seem to have been (partially) reversed in Germany, Greece and Italy after 1993.
Remember that Greece and Italy are both characterized by high government debt - GDP ratios.
While exhibiting a comparatively low debt ratio Germany experienced a period of rapidly
growing debt in the aftermath of unification.
These findings seem to support the theoretical models of Drazen (1990) and Perotti (1999),
both predicting that nonlinear effects are related to a critical situation or evolution of
government debt. This conclusion might be premature, however. Most of the coefficients
reported in table 5 are poorly estimated pointing to misspecification. Further research has to
reconsider the case for nonlinear effects of fiscal policy in models with richer dynamics.
Unfortunately, high-frequency data on fiscal policy are not available for most EU countries
so that it is impossible to estimate higher-order autoregressive distributed lag models.
Altogether, the results suggest that the finding of non-linear effects of fiscal policy reported in
GJP (2000) is not robust. However, they do not imply that non-linearities in the relationship
between fiscal policy and macroeconomic variables do not exist. Rather they indicate that panel
data models imposing slope homogeneity across countries may not be the appropriate method to
address this question. Further research will have to investigate whether non-linear effects of
fiscal policy exist for individual countries.16














Germany 34.9767 0.3438 0.5082 –0.1131 0.4695 –0.8868 –1.2574 0.7164
(6.6857) (4.3634) (4.7539) (–1.0332) (3.2009) (–2.4520) (–6.9248) (2.3389)
France 63.0119 0.0587 0.7228 0.2430 –0.0700 0.0502 –1.6240 0.0116
(7.4480) (0.5930) (5.8353) (2.9218) (–0.3866) (0.2719) (–5.9885) (0.0693)
United Kingdom 3.1087 0.7115 0.9344 –0.3725 –0.6725 0.4502 0.7111 –0.3655
(0.1428) (1.1245) (1.6035) (–0.4402) (–0.9539) (0.7142) (0.5984) (–0.7045)
Italy 44.3119 0.1596 0.4561 0.0843 0.4240 –0.5691 –1.6317 0.3814
(9.8518) (1.0768) (4.5879) (0.7726) (1.7207) (–2.1659) (–5.0504) (2.0853)
Spain 44.9273 –0.5810 1.1116 –0.5678 –0.0835 –0.0697 –0.2586 0.0449
(3.8156) (–0.6580) (2.5054) (–0.5122) (–0.0485) (–0.0362) (–0.5599) (0.0326)
Netherlands 61.1202 0.0193 0.6840 –0.3233 –0.0743 –0.2586 –1.1623 0.1289
(5.5939) (0.1344) (3.2242) (–2.1688) (–0.1190) (–0.4839) (–3.2463) (0.3229)
Belgium 47.0138 –0.4376 1.8282 –1.1171 0.0241 –0.5074 –0.4669 0.5742
(1.6194) (–0.5029) (1.1636) (–0.8123) (0.0288) (–1.0621) (–1.0085) (1.2845)
Sweden 0.2462 0.0244 0.3796 0.7289 0.5163 –0.2913 0.1061 0.3636
(0.0034) (0.0564) (0.2687) (0.3772) (0.3198) (–0.3360) (0.1162) (0.3913)
Austria 24.0687 0.2623 0.6202 –0.1237 0.3137 –0.3185 –0.5111 0.2348
(1.5379) (1.8825) (5.3651) (–1.1730) (1.2571) (–0.7808) (–0.7082) (0.6686)
Denmark 72.5864 0.4311 0.7006 0.1391 0.5686 –0.6164 –2.7050 0.5995
(2.6675) (0.9555) (2.3070) (0.5014) (1.0578) (–0.9372) (–1.5530) (0.9182)
Finland 42.4626 –0.0585 0.7427 0.0478 0.2062 0.0606 –0.8163 0.0291
(13.3457) (–0.5780) (5.4293) (0.3577) (0.9506) (0.8863) (–9.0793) (0.4448)
Greece –8.8290 0.4404 0.1356 –0.0757 1.2005 –1.2403 0.5183 0.4331
(–0.8788) (2.2655) (0.4124) (–0.1953) (3.4035) (–3.4662) (1.5537) (2.7318)
Portugal 37.9117 0.1224 0.6630 0.4696 0.3964 0.4543 –1.4712 –0.3324
(1.1033) (0.7575) (0.8337) (0.8495) (0.2490) (0.1579) (–2.0477) (–0.1707)
Ireland 54.4639 0.7473 0.1068 –0.5017 –1.5411 0.9220 –1.2837 –0.7291
(1.9681) (1.1179) (0.2438) (–0.6348) (–0.9316) (0.7673) (–2.3120) (–0.9128)
Mean Group 37.2415 0.1602 0.6853 –0.1058 0.1198 –0.2015 –0.8466 0.1493
(1.5158) (0.4249) (1.6036) (-0.2289) (0.1864) (-0.3528) (-0.9071) (0.3625)
aThis regression estimates the same equation as in table 4, column 2, for individual countries. Sample period is 1970–2000 in general,
shorter for some countries due to data (non-)availability. T–values are reported in parentheses. Statistically significant estimates (at
the 95 per cent level) of the interacted variables and the post-Maastricht dummy are shown in bold.17
5. Conclusion
This paper reconsidered the case for a nonlinear relationship between fiscal policy and
national saving for a panel of European Union countries. Unlike Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano
(2000) I could hardly find any support for the hypothesis that the effects of fiscal consolidation
are reversed whenever the fiscal impulse is large and persistent. Two factors seem to be
responsible for the non-robustness of their results: (i) The definition of fiscal consolidation
episodes is not time-invariant due to frequent revisions of cyclically-adjusted budget balances.
Empirical applications employing the same methodology at different points in time can lead to
diametrically opposed conclusions. (ii) I find strong evidence for the proposition of Haque,
Pesaran and Sharma ( 2000) who argue that highly significant, nonlinear effects for some
determinants of national saving in panel data models may be spurious due to neglected cross-
country heterogeneity.
In the second part of the empirical application I tried to remedy the first of the above
mentioned problems by proposing an alternative, time-invariant definition of fiscal
consolidation episodes. When in 1992 the governments of European Union member states
signed the Maastricht Treaty, they committed to sound public finances which in most cases
implied  reductions in public deficits in the run-up to monetary union. While the credibility of
this commitment can be — and has extensively been — questioned, the attractive time-
invariance property of this consolidation measure has been employed in order to re-assess the
case for nonlinear effects of fiscal policy. Notwithstanding, the panel results do not favor this
hypothesis. Yet, nonlinear effects could be detected in – admittedly crude – individual-country
regressions, interestingly for countries with a high government debt – GDP ratio (Greece and
Italy) or with rapidly rising debt (Germany).
This last result indicates that the analysis of individual-country experiences is a fruitful area
of future empirical research. Of course, this comes at a cost. Results obtained for a specific
country can not safely be generalized to other countries. In principle, general results could be
expected from the estimation of panel data models. Nonetheless, valid inference about
nonlinear effects necessitates a high degree of homogeneity across countries, a condition that
obviously was not met by the panel analyzed in this study. In the recent past, the influence of
fiscal policy on key macroeconomic variables in individual countries has been increasingly18
addressed in the structural VAR framework18. Most interesting regarding the question posed in
this paper is the analysis of Neumann (2000) who has examined the case for nonlinear effects of
fiscal policy in Germany employing a VAR model with time-varying coefficients. His results
indicate that – as claimed by Alesina and Perotti (1995) – nonlinear effects can be related to the
composition of fiscal consolidation programs rather than to their size and persistence. It should
be borne in mind, however, that the economic profession is still far from a consensus about the
appropriate way to identify (fiscal and monetary) policy effects in structural VAR models19.
All in all, the results indicate that the case for expansionary or non-Keynesian short-run
effects of fiscal contractions is at most weak, contradicting the evidence presented in Giavazzi,
Jappelli and Pagano (2000). These findings may be important for policy making in EMU
member states: in the present situation a number of countries have to decide whether to reduce
budget deficits gradually or to make a single strong consolidation effort in order to comply with
the medium-run provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. A need for additional time-series
evidence on the effects of fiscal consolidation in individual countries arises in order to be able
to give sound policy advice. However, the lack of high-frequency data on key fiscal variables
for most European countries makes it difficult to capture the dynamic effects of fiscal policy.
                                                
18  See Blanchard and Perotti (1999), Fatás and Mihov (2000) and Mountford and Uhlig (2000) for
example.
19  For insightful treatments of the identification problem in the analysis of (fiscal) policy effects see
Sims (1988) and Miller and Roberds (1992).19
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Appendix
Definition of Variables
All data are drawn from the OECD Statistical Compendium, No. 2/2000. For most of the
variables the data source is the OECD Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles database. The
nominal short-term interest rate and real private consumption are drawn from the OECD
Economic Outlook. Public sector data refer to the general government.
Table 6: Variables, Data Sources and Data Transformations
Variable Symbol OECD code Calculation
Real private consumption CPV
Private consumption deflator PCP
Nominal private consumption C CPV*PCP/100
Nominal government consumption CG
Nominal government investment IG
Nominal government spending G CG+IG
Nominal GDP Y GDP
Nominal national saving S GDP-CG-C
Nominal short-term interest rate IRS
Real short-term interest rate r IRS-(PCPt/PCPt-1-1)*100
Nominal government savings SAVG
Taxes net of transfers T SAVG+CG
Nominal potential output Y* GDPTR
Cyclically-adjusted budget surplus
(in per cent of potential GDP)
NLGQA22
Figure 2: Cyclically-adjusted Budget Balance and Output Gap for 14 EU Countries
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Figure 2: (continued)
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